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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Courts of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in denying G. Lawrence Critchfield's (hereafter 
"Critchfleld") Rule 60(b) post-judgment motion, insofar as it was premised on the 
grounds of mistake. 
Determinative Law: Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); Fisher v. Bvbee, 2004 UT 92, 104 
P.3d 1198; Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 
93 (Utah 1996); Franklin Covey Client Sales Inc. v. Melvin. 2000 UT App. 110, f 8, 2 
P.3d451. 
Standard of Review: "A trial court has discretion in determining whether a 
movant has shown [Rule 60(b) grounds], and this Court will reverse the trial court's 
ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion." Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205. 
206 (Utah 1998). 
"The outcome of Rule 60(b) motions are rarely vulnerable to attack. We grant 
broad discretion to trial court's rule 60(b) rulings because most are equitable in nature, 
saturated with facts, and call upon judges to apply fundamental principles of fairness that 
do not easily lend themselves to appellate review." Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, % 7, 
104 P.3d 1198. 
"That some basis may exist to set aside the default does not require the conclusion 
that the court abused its discretion in refusing to do so when facts and circumstances 
support the refusal." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1996). 
"An appeal or motion for new trial, rather than a [Rule] 60(b) motion, is the proper 
avenue to redress mistakes of law committed by the trial judge, as distinguished from 
clerical mistakes, caused by inadvertence, especially where the [Rule] 60(b) motion has 
been filed after the time for appeal has expired." Franklin Covey Client Sales Inc. v. 
Melvin, 2000 UT App. 110, ^ 21. 
"Even where an order on a Rule 60(b) motion is appealable, the appeal is narrow 
in scope. An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the denial or 
grant of relief. The appeal does not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of the 
underling judgment from which relief was sought. Appellate review of Rule 60(b) orders 
must be narrowed in this manner lest Rule 60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals." 
Franklin Covey Client Sales Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App. 110, U 19 (quoting 12 James 
Wm. Moore et al. Moore's Federal Practice § 60.68[3] (3d ed. 1999). 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in denying Critchfield's Rule 60(b) post-judgment 
motion, insofar as it was premised on the grounds of inadvertence or excusable neglect. 
Determinative Law: Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); Fisher v. Bvbee, 2004 UT 92, 104 
P.3d 1198; Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 
93 (Utah 1996). 
Standard of Review: "A trial court has discretion in determining whether a 
movant has shown [Rule 60(b) grounds], and this Court will reverse the trial court's 
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ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion." Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205. 
206 (Utah 1998). 
"The outcome of Rule 60(b) motions are rarely vulnerable to attack. We grant 
broad discretion to trial court's rule 60(b) rulings because most are equitable in nature, 
saturated with facts, and call upon judges to apply fundamental principles of fairness that 
do not easily lend themselves to appellate review." Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92,17, 
104 P.3d 1198. 
"That some basis may exist to set aside the default does not require the conclusion 
that the court abused its discretion in refusing to do so when facts and circumstances 
support the refusal." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1996). 
Issue 3: Did the trial court err in awarding damages against Critchfield without 
making adequate findings to support the award of damages. 
Determinative Law: Utah R. Civ. P. 59(1)(6). 
Standard of Review: This issue would be an issue of law reviewed for 
correctness. However, this issue was not raised in Critchfield's Rule 60(b) Motion, and 
thus, was not preserved for appeal. Moreover, mistakes of law are properly the subject of 
a Rule 59 Motion, and would have been required to be filed within 10 days of the entry of 
Judgment. Thus, even if this issue had been briefed in conjunction with Critchfield's 
Rule 60(b) Motion, it was not timely filed, and thus, was not preserved for appeal. 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
This case is governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), which reads in pertinent part: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered 
evidence; fraud, etc. On Motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken[.] 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (2005). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 is also determinative with respect to addressing the propriety of 
certain issues within the context of this appeal. This Rule reads in pertinent part: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes . . . [ : ] 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court[.] 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages[.] 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence[.] 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment[.J 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(2005). 
The rule regarding withdrawal of counsel applicable during the time-period 
relevant to this lawsuit was as follows: 
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Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of 
counsel in civil cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceedings in trial courts 
of record except guardians ad litem and court-appointed counsel. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Withdrawal requiring court approval. Consistent with the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, an attorney may withdraw as counsel of record 
only upon approval of the court when a motion has been filed and the court 
has not issued an order on the motion or after a certificate of readiness for 
trial has been filed. Under these circumstances, an attorney may not 
withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. 
(2) Withdrawal not requiring court approval. If an attorney 
withdraws under circumstances where court approval is not required, the 
notice of withdrawal shall include a statement by the attorney that no 
motion has been filed on which the court has not issued an order and that 
no certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. 
(3) If an attorney withdraws, dies, is suspended from the practice of 
law, is disbarred, or is removed from the case by the court, opposing 
counsel shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the 
unrepresented client. The Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must 
inform the unrepresented client of the responsibility to appear in court or 
appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must 
be filed with the court. No further proceedings shall be held in the case 
until 20 days have elapsed from filing of the Notice to Appear or Appoint 
Counsel unless the client of the withdrawing attorney waives the time 
requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the court[.] 
Utah R. Judicial Admin. 4-506 (2003). This rule was repealed effective November 1, 
2003, after the trial in this matter. A copy of this Rule is attached as Exhibit "A" hereto. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
As reflected in the record, the final judgment in this case was the resolution of a 
lengthy and drawn out process, with defendant G. Lawrence Critchfield (hereafter 
"Critchfield") repeatedly failing to appear for scheduled depositions or to timely respond 
to discovery requests. [R. 827-871.] For a long period of time, Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' 
counsel went out of their way to accommodate Critchfield, who was allegedly not in 
good health, by way of multiple continuances and reschedulings. [Id.]. However, at 
some point, Plaintiffs decided not to schedule the continuance of Critchfield's deposition 
and proceed to trial. [Id.]. 
A trial was scheduled during a May 15, 2003, telephonic conference with the 
Court, in which Critchfield's attorney participated. [R. 872-890]. Critchfield terminated 
his attorney approximately one month after the trial was scheduled. [Id.]. Shortly 
thereafter, Critchfield's attorney filed a "Withdrawal of Counsel," a "Motion to Allow 
Withdrawal of Counsel," and an "Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel." [See Docket 
entries dated 6-19-03 and 6-20-03, attached as Addendum "A" to Appellant's Brief]. A 
certificate of service indicates all three pleadings were mailed to Critchfield. [See 
Exhibit C to Appellees' Brief]. On about June 16, 2003, counsel for defendant WESPAC 
Holdings served a Notice to Appear or Appoint. [R. 872-890]. Critchfield admits he 
received such Notice. [R. 777-809]. Critchfield also admits that he received a "trial 
brief and "subpoena" prior to trial, while he was out of town. [Id.]. 
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On October 1, 2003, plaintiffs5 attorney and plaintiffs, and attorney for defendant 
WESPAC Holdings, together with a subpoenaed witness, appeared at Court for trial. 
Neither Critchfield nor his attorney appeared. A trial was held and judgment issued on or 
about November 12,2003. [See Docket entry dated 10-1-03, attached as Addendum "A" 
to Appellant's Brief]. 
The primary issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Critchfield's Rule 60(b) post-judgment motion for relief from 
judgment premised upon mistake or inadvertence. As argued below, the "third" issue, 
whether there were adequate findings to support the judgment in this matter, was not 
preserved for appeal, and would not have been the proper subject of a Rule 60(b) motion 
in any event. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The first deposition of Critchfield was scheduled for January 20, 2000. [R. 
827-871]. 
2. On May 4, 2001, after numerous continuances and reschedulings to 
accommodate Critchfield, the first deposition was held. [Id.]. 
3. To accommodate Critchfield, the deposition was cut short and the 
continuation of the deposition was scheduled for May 22, 2001, at 9:30 a.m. [Id.]. 
4. On May 22,2001, at 9:00 a.m., Critchfield's attorney called to cancel this 
deposition. The appearance of plaintiffs' counsel was documented by the court reporter. 
[MO. 
7 
5. Thereafter, plaintiffs' counsel attempted numerous times to schedule the 
continuation of the deposition, but were unsuccessful due to Critchfield's failure to 
appear or repeated requests for continuance. [Id.]. 
6. On May 15, 2003, attorney for plaintiffs, attorney for defendants WESPAC 
Holdings, L.L.C., and Paul Christensen, and attorney for Critchfield, Wesley Sine, 
participated in a telephone conference with the Court. [R. 842-890]. 
7. During the May 15, 2003, telephonic status and scheduling conference, 
Judge Dutson set a bench trial for October 1, 2, and 3, 2003. [Id.]. 
8. On or about June 12, 2003, plaintiffs' counsel received a letter from Wesley 
Sine (through counsel for defendant WESPAC Holdings, indicating that Critchfield had 
terminated Sine but would have an attorney present at Critchfield's deposition, scheduled 
for June 16,2003. [Id.]. A copy of the letter from Wesley Sine is attached as Exhibit 
"B" hereto. 
9. On or about June 12, 2003, Timothy W. Blackburn received a Withdrawal 
of Counsel, Motion to Withdraw and Order of Withdrawal from attorney Sine. [R. 827-
871]. A copy of such pleadings are attached as Exhibit "C" hereto. 
10. The Withdrawal of Counsel, Motion to Withdraw and Order of Withdrawal 
were filed with the court. [See Docket entries dated 6-19-03 and 6-20-03, attached as 
Addendum "A" to Appellant's Brief]. 
11. On or about June 16, 2003, Derek Langton served Critchfield with a Notice 
to Appear or Appoint Counsel. [R. 872-890]. A copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint 
is attached as Exhibit "D" hereto. 
8 
12. Critchfield did in fact receive this Notice. [R. 777-809]. A copy of 
Critchfield's Affidavit in support of Motion to Set Aside Judgment is attached as Exhibit 
"E" hereto. 
13. Although Critchfield contacted attorney Alan Mecham, Mr. Mecham 
informed Critchfield that he was not able to enter an appearance on Critchfield's behalf. 
[R. 777-809]. [See also Exhibit "E" hereto]. 
14. On or about September 24, 2003, defendant WESPAC Holdings served its 
"Trial Brief on Critchfield. [See Docket entry dated 9-24-03, attached as Addendum 
"A" to Appellant's Brief). 
15. On or about September 25, 2003, Plaintiffs served Mr. Critchfield with a 
copy of a "Subpoena to Doug Longfellow/9 indicating that Longfellow's testimony was 
requested on October 1, 2003. [R. 827-871]. 
16. Critchfield did receive the trial brief and subpoena but was out of town. [R. 
777-809]. [See also Exhibit "E" hereto]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is no basis to reverse the decision of the trial court in this case. The trial 
court acted within its discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment on a Rule 60(b) 
Motion. Critchfield failed to demonstrate to the trial court that there was a "mistake" or 
"inadvertence" justifying setting aside the judgment, or that Critchfield exercised 
diligence in failing to appear at trial. Finally, the issue of whether the findings of fact 
support the judgment in this matter was not preserved for appeal and should not be 
addressed by the Court of Appeals. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. (ISSUE I). A MISTAKE OF LAW IS NOT THE PROPER SUBJECT 
OF A RULE 60(b) MOTION 
Critchfield argues that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the judgment 
after it was alerted to the fact by way of Critchfield's Rule 60(b) Motion, that it 
"mistakenly assumed it had ruled on the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel; therefore, the 
required time to appoint new counsel never began," Appellant's Brief at 10.l 
This argument fails for the reason that the proper procedure to alert the court to 
such a judicial "mistake" or "irregularity in the proceedings" is by way of a Rule 59 
Motion rather than a Rule 60(b) Motion. The Utah Supreme Court recently discussed the 
narrow scope of a Rule 60(b) Motion in the case of Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, 104 
P.3d 1198, wherein the appellant sought to set aside a judgment based on the trial court's 
mistaken interpretation of the law. In Fisher, "[the appellant] insisted that the trial court 
must have been mistaken within the meaning of rule 60(b)(1) when it failed to provide 
him with the notice that the orders extending the judgment had been entered, and when it 
granted the Fishers' motion in contravention of section 78-12-22 of the Utah Code[.]" Id. 
T[5. Further, 
[t]he trial court agreed with Mr. Bybee that section 78-12-22 
required that a separate suit be initiated to renew a judgment and that 
the Fishers had proceeded improperly when they renewed their 
judgment by motion. The trial court declined, however, to set aside 
the order renewing the judgment, holding that Judge Harding's 
1
 Critchfield characterizes the first issue as a "question of law," "reviewed for 
correctness, one involving the Court's interpretation of a statute, rule or ordinance. 
Appellant's Brief at 2. 
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decision to grant the motion and to enter the order was not a 
"mistake" within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1). 
Id. 16. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court that the 
"mistake" at issue was not the proper subject of a Rule 60(b)(1) Motion. The Court 
reasoned: 
Relying on the guidance from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
our court of appeals pared back its definition of judicial "mistake" to 
include only the correctness of "a minor oversight, such as the 
omission of damages, which in most cases would be obvious." . . . 
We find the court of appeals's explication of rule 60(b)(1) "mistake" 
sound, and we therefore endorse it. 
Id. Tj 11 (citing Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, If 19, 2 
P.3d 451.). The Supreme Court further reasoned: 
In addition, by clarifying that the term "mistake," as used in rule 
60(b)(1), has general application to the activities of counsel and 
parties, but seldom extends to judicial decisions, we bring logical 
harmony to this component of the rule. The other forms of 
unintentional conduct that rule 60(b)(1) deems eligible to be 
considered as grounds to set aside a judgment—inadvertence, 
surprise, and excusable neglect—are aptly suited to describe 
circumstances which might befall counsel or parties. . . . Those 
afflicted by these circumstances are also best suited to explain them 
to a court in a motion for relief under rule 60(b)(1). The same is not 
true of the inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, which might influence 
the decision of judges. 
Id. 1f 12. In sum, a legal "mistake" wherein the court mistakenly thought appellant's 
counsel had withdrawn, or that the court was mistaken in allowing counsel to withdraw 
without ruling on the motion, is the proper province of Rule 59(a)(1) or (a)(7), which 
must be filed within ten (10) days of judgment, and not one which falls under a Rule 
60(b) Motion. See also Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 200 UT App 110 (an 
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appeal or motion for new trial, rather than a 60(b) motion, is the proper way to redress 
mistakes of law committed by the trial court. Parties should not be allowed to escape the 
consequences of their failure to timely appeal by addressing questions of law to the trial 
court for reconsideration.). Accordingly, this issue was not timely filed and should not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
Even were the court's "mistake" properly before the Court on a Rule 60(b) 
motion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to set aside the judgment on 
this basis. 
Critchfield cites Sperrv v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 1984), in support of his 
argument that the trial court's decision should be reversed. In Sperrv, the trial court 
proceeded with trial despite the fact that after defendant's counsel withdrew, plaintiffs 
counsel failed to file a Notice to Appear or Appoint. The Utah Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court's decision denying a motion to vacate the judgment because it found that 
the trial court failed to follow a rule of court in not requiring plaintiffs counsel to prepare 
a Notice to Appear or Appoint. Id. at 583. However, the instant case is clearly 
distinguishable from Sperrv, because in this case, counsel for co-defendant did send out a 
Notice to Appear or Appoint, and Critchfield did in fact receive that notice. [R. 777-809] 
[See also Exhibit "E" hereto]. 
Critchfield argues that the Notice to Appear or Appoint was defective because his 
counsel never effectively withdrew. The facts of Sperrv are relevant to this point. In 
Sperrv, plaintiffs counsel made the same argument in defense of the fact that it had 
failed to file a Notice to Appear or Appoint. Id. at 582. The Utah Supreme Court found 
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that defendant's counsel had "substantially complied" with the rule: he filed the 
appropriate pleadings, and did in fact notify his client of his withdrawal. Id. 
In the instant case, Critchfield's counsel filed pleadings with the court to 
effectuate his withdrawal pursuant to Rule 4-506. [R. 827-871, and Exhibit "C" hereto]. 
Perhaps unclear whether a motion was required, he filed a Motion to Allow Withdraw of 
Counsel and an Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel in addition to a Withdrawal of 
Counsel. [R. 827-871, and Exhibit "C" hereto]. Pursuant to the rule in effect at the time 
of trial, a motion is required when there is a pending motion or a certificate of readiness 
has been filed. Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-506 (1). Critchfield's counsel noted on his 
Withdrawal that there was no pending motion and a certificate of readiness had not been 
filed, although a trial was scheduled. He also stated in his motion that "[defendants have 
terminated Wesley F. Sine as their attorney. From the tenor of the termination letter, it 
would be impossible for Wesley F. Sine to continue as counsel." In addition, he stated 
that a trial was scheduled in October 2003. Critchfield avers that he did not receive these 
pleadings.2 However, as a practical matter, there is no question that Critchfield was 
aware his counsel had withdrawn, because Critchfield terminated his counsel under 
conditions where it would have been impossible for counsel to continue his 
representation. The Court was also aware that counsel had withdrawn after a trial had 
been scheduled, because Critchfield's counsel was present at the scheduling of the trial 
2
 The Certificate of Service signed by Wesley F. Sine, indicates that all of these pleadings 
were mailed on June 12, 2003, to G. Lawrence Critchfield, Western Real Estate 
Investment. 
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with the Court. Finally, the court acknowledged at trial that Critchfield was not 
represented by counsel and that a Notice to Appear or Appoint had been sent. 
The trial court clearly has discretion to allow withdrawal of counsel. Washington 
v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The grant or denial of 
an attorney's motion to withdraw in a civil case is a matter addressed to the discretion of 
the trial court and will be reversed on appeal only when the trial court has abused its 
discretion.'1) Thus, in this case, there was "substantial compliance" with Rule 4-506, and 
Critchfield's counsel did effectively withdraw. A "mistake," if any, was harmless and 
should have been overcome in any event by some diligence on Critchfield's part to 
ensure he was adequately represented by counsel or otherwise make an appearance before 
the court. 
In sum, the issue of whether the requirements of Rule 4-506 were met is a 
question of law or a "procedural irregularity" that should have been addressed by a Rule 
59 motion filed within ten days of judgment. However, even if the issue was properly 
brought under Rule 60(b), where the Withdrawal of Critchfield's counsel and the Notice 
to Appear or Appoint were served 3 XA months prior to trial, and where Critchfield 
terminated his own counsel under circumstances making it impossible for the counsel to 
continue his representation, any failure of the Court in not signing the Order of 
Withdrawal was a technicality not arising to the level of a "mistake" justifying setting 
aside the judgment. Thus, the Court's refusal to set aside the judgment on this basis was 
well within the discretion of the trial court and should be affirmed. 
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B. (ISSUE 2). CRITCHFIELD'S ACTIONS IN THIS CASE, OR LACK 
THEREOF, DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE "INADVERTANCE" 
PRONG OF RULE 60(b) 
Critchfield's failure to appoint new counsel, and failure to appear at the trial in this 
matter, do not rise to the level of "inadvertence, or excusable neglect" contemplated by 
Rule 60(b). Inadvertence and excusable neglect have been used by Utah courts 
interchangeably, but both require some form of diligence or reasonable action on the part 
of the party asserting such excuse, to justify the court's taking action on the basis thereof. 
For example, in the context of setting aside a stipulation, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "a court may set aside a stipulation for inadvertence or justifiable cause 'if the 
mistake is not due to the failure to exercise due diligence and it could not have been 
avoided by the exercise or ordinary care/95 Rivera v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. 
Co., 2000 UT 36, f 11, 1 P.3d 539. 
Utah courts have also defined "excusable neglect" as it is used in Rule 60(b) to 
require some form of due diligence. 
Rule 60(b)(1) confers discretion upon a trial court judge to set aside 
a judgment for "excusable neglect." We have heretofore defined 
"excusable neglect" as the exercise of "due diligence" by a 
reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances. Even if we 
were to consider any argued distinction between "good cause" and 
"excusable neglect," which we expressly decline to do, the 
undisputed facts here do not support any claim that the employer 
diligently acted in a reasonably prudent manner in failing to file its 
response until three weeks after it was due." With knowledge that 
the notice was forthcoming and a response was necessary, the 
employer's neglect or mistake was not excusable. 
Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) (citation 
omitted). 
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In the context of setting aside a default judgment, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated: "[A] party trying to set aside a default judgment 'must show that he has used due 
diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had 
no control/" Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855, 859 (Utah 1979). 
Critchfield has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing 
to set aside the judgment on the basis of "inadvertence or excusable neglect." Critchfield 
has not established that he exercised due diligence, or that his failure to appear at trial 
was for reasons beyond his control. A three-day trial in this matter was scheduled during 
a telephonic pre-trial counsel with the Court, with Critchfield's attorney, Wesley Sine, 
present, prior to Sine's withdrawing as counsel. [R. 842-890]. Mr. Sine did not 
withdraw as Critchfield's counsel until approximately one-month after the trial was 
scheduled. [R. 842-890, and Exhibit "B" hereto]. There was plenty of time for Sine to 
inform Critchfield of the trial dates. Moreover, on or about June 16,2003, attorney for 
WESPAC Holdings sent Critchfield a Notice to Appear or Appoint. [R. 842-890]. By 
his own admission, Critchfield did receive such Notice. [R. 777-809, and Exhibit "E" 
hereto.] There was more than enough time for Critchfield to obtain new counsel prior to 
the October 1, 2003, trial date. Although Appellant's counsel argues that the Notice to 
Appear or Appoint was defective because there had not been a technical withdrawal, this 
should not have had a practical effect on Critchfield who had no notice of any alleged 
defect, and who had himself terminated his own counsel. Although Critchfield contacted 
friends, some of whom were attorneys, to look into matters for him, one specifically 
informed him he would not be able to enter an appearance in the case. [R. 777-809, and 
16 
Exhibit "E" hereto.] Critchfield never did hire other counsel to enter an appearance on 
his behalf, or appear pro se prior to trial. 
Additionally, a week before trial, Plaintiffs sent Critchfield a copy of a Subpoena, 
indicating that Doug Longfellow's testimony was required in court October 1, 2003. [R. 
827-871]. Defendant WESPAC Holdings also sent Critchfield a "Trial Brief 
approximately one week before trial. [See Docket entry dated 9-24-03, attached as 
Addendum "A" to Appellant's Brief]. Critchfield admitted to having received such 
documents although he was out of town. [R. 777-809, and Exhibit "E" hereto.] 
Receiving such documents should have sparked at least curiosity by a pro se litigant. If 
Critchfield was out of town at the time these documents were sent to him, given that he 
never obtained a new attorney, this does not constitute excusable neglect. The facts of 
this case are similar to the case of Valley Leasing v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959, 960 (Utah 
1983). There, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to set aside the 
judgment based on excusable neglect where defendant failed to appear at trial but sent his 
wife. The Court reasoned: 
In the instant case, defendant had notice for nearly a year prior to 
trial that his counsel had withdrawn,, Counsel had advised him to 
hire new counsel or to appear on his own behalf at trial, yet he saw 
fit to send his wife instead. He made no showing that he was in any 
way prevented from appearing at trial by circumstances over which 
he had no control. Mere inconvenience or the press of personal 
business affairs is not deemed as an excuse for failure to appear at 
trial. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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Critchfield argues as an excuse that his failure to appear at trial was in part due to 
the failure of his prior counsel, Wesley Sine, who was present at a telephonic conference 
call with the Court when the trial was scheduled, and who remained counsel to 
Critchfield for nearly one month after the trial was scheduled. Critchfield's then-
counsel's failure to notify his own client of the trial dates is certainly not an excusable 
event that warrants the setting aside of the Judgment in this matter. The case of Airkem 
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429 (Utah 1973), is directly on point in this 
regard. In Parker, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to set aside a 
judgment on the basis of excusable neglect. The Court noted that "the movant must show 
that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by 
circumstances over which he had no control." Id. at 431. In finding that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court reasoned: 
In the instant action, defendant was informed in February that the 
mater would probably be set for trial in early autumn; he also knew 
of the irregular hours during which he was present in his home. His 
failure to contact his counsel under such circumstances could 
reasonably be considered as not constituting due diligence by the 
trial court. Defense counsel was informed in early May of the trial 
setting in September, his belated efforts ten days prior to trial to 
contact his client, particularly when there is no allegation as to the 
means of communication utilized, might reasonably be considered as 
not indicating due diligence. Since defendant's conduct was not 
entirely inexcusable, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
refusing to relieve defendant of the judgment. 
Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the trial court in the instant case was justified in not 
considering the failings of Critchfield's counsel an "excusable event" warranting setting 
aside the judgment. See also Parke-Chapley Constr. Co. v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907, 
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913 (7 Cir. 1989) (stating, "attorney errors such as preoccupation with other matters, 
irresponsibility of counsel, tactical decisions and misreading of procedural rules" do not 
rise to the level of "excusable neglect"). 
In sum, Plaintiffs should not be prejudiced by the inexcusable conduct of 
Critchfield's prior counsel, the failure of Critchfield's alleged safety net of friends to 
exercise diligence in checking on the status of trial, or of Critchfield's own failure to 
timely checking his mail while he was out of town. The facts and circumstances support 
the trial court's refusal to set aside the judgment on the basis of "excusable neglect," and 
accordingly, the trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
C. (ISSUE 3), THE ISSUE OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE COURT'S 
FINDINGS WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented 
to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity 
to rule on that issue. . . . . This requirement puts the trial judge on 
notice of the asserted error and allows for correction at that time in 
the course of the proceeding. For a trial court to be afforded an 
opportunity to correct the error "(1) the issue must be raised in a 
timely fashionf,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and (3) 
the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant 
legal authority." . . . . . Issues that are not raised at trial are usually 
deemed waived. 
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, f 51, 99 P.3d 801 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
Critchfield argues on appeal that the findings of fact are not sufficient to support 
the judgment against Critchfield. However, this issue was not raised as part of 
Critchfield's Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. Appellant sets forth certain 
"facts" in his "Statement of Facts" which appear to be "relevant" to the issue of the 
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adequacy of the findings, and refers to some of these facts in his argument on Issue 3. 
See Appellant's Brief pp 7-8, 14. The record citation given by Appellant for these 
"facts" is "R. 777-809," listed in the docket Index prepared by the Second District Court 
in conjunction with this appeal, as: "Affidavit of G. Lawrence Critchfield in support of 
motion for relief from judgment." However, the "facts" attributed to this Affidavit are 
not, in fact, set forth in this Affidavit, rather, they were set forth in the Affidavit 
submitted in support of Appellant's Reply Brief, listed in the Court Index at 925-944. 
These facts were used in response to Plaintiffs' argument that Defendant never even 
attempted to argue that he had a "meritorious defense" as required in a Motion to Set 
Aside the Judgment. This prong is only reached if the threshold questions of mistake, 
and inadvertence are met, which the trial court determined he did not meet. See State ex 
rel. Utah State Department of Social Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-1056 
(Utah 1983). 
Even where an order on a Rule 60(b) motion is appealable, the 
appeal is narrow in scope. An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order 
addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief. The 
appeal does not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of the 
underling judgment from which relief was sought. Appellate review 
of Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in this manner lest Rule 
60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals. 
Franklin Covey Client Sales Inc. v. Melvin. 2000 UT App. 110,1f 19, 2 P.3d 451 
(quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al. Moore's Federal Practice § 60.68[3] (3d ed. 1999). 
At best, Critchfield set forth certain facts in his Reply Memorandum before the 
trial court, presumably to support the contention that he would have had a "meritorious 
defense" to Plaintiffs' allegations were he allowed to put on evidence as such, as required 
20 
under Rule 60. See State ex rel. Utah State Department of Social Servs. v. Musselman. 
667 P.2d 1053, 1055-1056 (Utah 1983). However, Critchfiekfs argument on appeal that: 
"The trial court erred when it awarded damages against Critchfield personally and 
awarded punitive damages without making adequate findings to support the conclusion of 
fraud and inadequate findings to support the amount of punitive damages awarded," was 
not preserved below. This argument, attacking the damages and the sufficiency of the 
evidence, would have been the subject of a Rule 59(a) Motion ("excessive or inadequate 
damages/' (a)(5), "insufficiency of evidence to justify verdict" (a)(6)), which was 
required to be brought within ten days of the judgment. As such, this issue was not 
timely raised, and is not properly before the Court on appeal, and does not provide a basis 
for reversal or remand. 
Moreover, even if Appellant has somehow preserved this argument for appeal, 
Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. 
To successfully challenge an ultimate finding of fact, Man appellant 
must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court 
below." . . . . An appellant "must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." . . . . 
Moreover, an appellant may not simply review the evidence 
presented at trial, nor may she "re-argue the factual case [she] 
presented in the trial court." . . . . If an appellant argues that no 
evidence supports a factual finding, the burden to marshal does not 
then shift to the appellee; rather, the appellee may prove that the 
appellant did not meet her marshaling burden by presenting a 
"scintilla" of evidence supporting the district court's finding. 
Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22 , If 25, 112 P.3d 495 (citations omitted). 
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In this case, in addition to the testimony of Michael Hendry and Douglas 
Longfellow, there was documentary evidence introduced to support the trial court's 
findings, including, among other things, a Trust Deed Note signed by G. Lawrence 
Critchfield individually [Trial Exhibit 1]; and a letter from a New York law firm 
acknowledging receipt of Plaintiffs' $150,000.00, and indicating that such funds were to 
be dispersed rather than held. Critchfield acknowledged this letter individually and on 
behalf of Western Real Estate Investment Trust [Trial Exhibit 11 ]. Such evidence is 
sufficient to support the trial court's findings. See Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22 , f 
25,112P.3d495. 
Accordingly, there is no basis to reverse or remand this case for the reason that the 
damages awarded by the Court were not supported by adequate findings. Thus, 
Appellant's appeal must be denied with respect to this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellees respectfully request that this Court affirm the 
trial court's denial of Critchfield's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment, and 
affirm the decision of the trial court in all other respects. 
sf 
DATED this _f day of September, 2005. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
Mara A. Brown 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the (Q day of September, 2005,1 caused two copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to be mailed in the United States mail, first class 
postage prepaid to the following: 
Steve S. Christensen 
HIRSCHI, CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3156 
villi! &^ AAHA-
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Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-506 (2003). 
Letter from Wesley Sine [R. 837-891, page 2 of Exhibit "M" thereto]. 
Withdrawal of Counsel, Motion to Withdraw and Order of Withdrawal 
from Attorney Sine [R. 837-891, and Docket entries dated 6-19-03 and 6-
20-03, attached as Addendum "A" to Appellant's Brief]. 
Notice to Appear or Appoint [R. 872-890]. 
Critchfield's Affidavit in Support of Motion to Set Aside Judgment [R. 
777-809]. 
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augmentation of attorney fees awarded pursuant to this rule, it shall consider 
the attorney time spent prior to the entry of judgment, the amount of attorney 
fees included in the judgment, and the statements contained in the affidavit 
supporting the motion for augmentation. 
(6) Prior to entry of a judgment which grants attorney fees pursuant to this 
rule, any party may move the court to depart from the fees allowed by 
paragraph (1) of this rule. Such application shall be made pursuant to Rule 
4-505. 
(7) If a contract or other document provides for an award of attorney fees, an 
original or copy of the document shall be made a part of the file before attorney 
fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule. 
(8) No affidavit for attorney fees need be filed in order to receive an award 
of attorney fees pursuant to this rule. 
(9) No attorney fees awarded pursuant to this rule, nor portion thereof, may 
be shared in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4. 
(Added effective March 31, 1992; amended effective November 15, 1995; 
November 1, 2002.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend- "Damages" for "Judgment" and added "and In-
ment substituted "principal damages amount of terest" in the first column head and made 
$5,000 or less" for "principal amount of $5,000 stylistic changes, 
or less" twice and, in the table, substituted 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction. Construction with other rules. 
Construction with other rules. The trial court's decision denying plaintiff's 
request for attorney fees was reversed and 
Construction. remanded for a determination of an award of 
Attorney-fee-augmentation motions under
 r e a s o n a b l e a t t f e e s p u r s u a n t t o R u l e Subdivision (6) are not conclusively governed
 A crkC , , u -, , -x^i. i. • i \- i.1. r L. J I • xi. i • i.u 4-505 where the record was unclear if the trial by the fee schedule, since the language m the , , ,,
 c U J I • ™ i A m* ^ ;
, j . . • il j j j i. x* court used the fee schedule in Rule 4-505.01 
subdivision is very broad and does not mention ,
 r ,, r , . . . ^ .± 
any restrictions imposed by the schedule. merely as one of the factors in arriving at its 
NAB., Inc. v. Farr, 2000 UT App 62, 997 P.2d df c l s l°£. t h a t **» attorney fees requested by 
340 plaintiff were not to be awarded, or whether the 
Subdivision (6) of this rule, which deals with t r i ,a l c o u ^ Sieved that Rule 4-505.01 was the 
attorney fees incurred before judgment, does s o l e mechanism to award fees. N.A.R., Inc. v. 
not affect the implementation of Subdivision M a r c e k > 2 0 0 0 U T APP 300> 13 R3d 612. 
(5), which deals with attorney fees incurred 
post-judgment. N.A.R., Inc. v. Farr, 2000 UT 
App 62, 997 P.2d 343. 
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of counsel in 
civil cases. 
Applicability? 
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceedings in trial courts of 
record except guardians ad litem and court-appointed counsel. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Withdrawal requiring court approval. Consistent with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, an attorney may withdraw as counsel of record only 
upon approval of the court when a motion has been filed and the court has not 
issued an order on the motion or after a certificate of readiness for trial has 
been filed. Under these circumstances, an attorney may not withdraw except 
upon motion and order of the court. 
(2) Withdrawal not requiring court approval. If an attorney withdraws 
under circumstances where court approval is not required, the notice of 
withdrawal shall include a statement by the attorney that no motion has been 
Rule 4-507 RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1164 
filed on which the court has not issued an order and that no certificate of 
readiness for trial has been filed. 
(3) If an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, the withdrawing attorney 
must serve written notice of the withdrawal upon the client of the withdrawing 
attorney and upon all other parties not in default. A certificate of service must 
be filed with the court. If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal 
shall include a notification of the trial date. 
(4) If an attorney withdraws, dies, is suspended from the practice of law, is 
disbarred, or is removed from the case by the court, opposing counsel shall 
serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the unrepresented client. The 
Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must inform the unrepresented client of 
the responsibility to appear in a court or appoint counsel. Ajcopv of the Notice 
to Appear or Appoint Counsel must be filed with the court. No further 
proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days have elapsed from filing of 
the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the client of the withdrawing 
attorney waives the time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the 
court. 
(5) Substitution of counsel. An attorney may replace the current counsel of 
record by filing and serving a notice of substitution of counsel. Filing a 
substitution of counsel enters the appearance of new counsel of record and 
effectuates the withdrawal of the attorney being replaced. Where a request for 
a delay of proceedings is not made, substitution of counsel does not require the 
approval of the court. Where new counsel requests a delay of proceedings, 
substitution of counsel requires the approval of the court as provided in this 
rule. 
(Amended effective January 15,1990; April 15, 1991; May 15, 1994; November 
1, 1997.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Notice to appoint counsel. Because this rule compels opposing counsel 
.Cited. to file a required notice and also directs the 
. ' . trial court to wait 20 days after that filing 
Notice to appomt counsel. -.
 b e f o r e h o W i f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s t h e COurt 
Defendants failure to give notice to plaintiff
 e r r e ( J b s t r f k i ft w i f e , s l e a d i a n d l a c i n g 
of its responsibility to appoint counsel under
 h e r ^ ^ a f t e r h e r ^ ^ ^ m 0 . 
Subdivision (3) before filing its motion to dis- ,. , . , , ,
 T ° , °TT 1QQQ 
, , ., . r xi. » •  i 4. i. tion to withdraw. Loporto v. Hoegemann, 19yy 
miss rendered it improper for the trial court to
 TTT A 17_ QQ9 p 9 \ r.Qa ° 
dismiss plaintiff's action, notwithstanding the U 1 A p p 1/5> y b^ *za bbb' 
inordinate period of inactivity that preceded Cited in Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah 
defendant's motion to dismiss. Hartford Leas-
 C t A 1 9 9 1 ) R o c i e r i c k v> R i c k s 2002 UT 84, 
ing Corp. v. State, 888 R2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 5 4 R 3 d l l l 9 
1994). 
Rule 4-507. Disposition of funds on trustee 's sale. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing trustee affidavits of deposit and 
claimant petitions for adjudication of priority in trustee's sales. 
To establish a uniform procedure in determining the disposition of funds on 
trustee's sales. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the Court any proceeds from 
a truster's sale in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-29, the trustee 
shall file an affidavit with the clerk setting forth the facts of the deposit and a 
list of all known claimants, including known addresses. The clerk shall notify 
the listed claimants within 10 days of receiving the affidavit of deposit. 
(2) Any claimant may then file a petition for adjudication of priority to these 
funds and request a hearing before the court. The n p t ^ i ^ -
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Attorney and Counselor At Law 
IBM BUILDING SUITE 355- 420 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 841II 
Teh (801)364-5125 Fax: (801)521-0732 
COMMUNICATION 
DATE: June 12, 2003 
TO: Derek Langton 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
FAX NO: 801536 6111 
FROM: Wesley F. Sine 
REGARDING: HENDRY VS. UN1DYN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT CORP. 
TOTAL PAGES: (Including Cover Sheet): 1 
MESSAGE: 
Dear Derek: 
J have not received a Notice of Deposition of Mr. Critchfield although I have 
calendered for June 16, 2003 and have faxed a communication to Mr. Critchfield's last 
known Fax number informing him of it. I have called his telephone number but have not 
been able to speak with anyone. 
1 just received a fax from him which terminated me as legal counsel in this matter. I 
am told that someone else will handle the Deposition for him. 
Page 1 of 1 
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Wesley F. Sine #2967 
Attorney For Defendant 
IBM Building Suite 355 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 
Telephone 801 364-5125 
Fax: 801 521-0732 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL L. HENDRY, DOUGLAS 
BASSETT, & FIVE "T" CORPORATION 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIDYN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, DOUGLAS 
LONGFELLOW, G LAWRENCE 
CRITCHFIELD, PAUL CHRISTENSEN 
WESTERN REAL ESTATE INVEST-
MENT TRUST, and DOES 1-10 
Defendants 
WITHDRAW!. OF COUNSEL 
Civil # 990906082 
Judge Roger S Dutson 
COMES now Wesley F Sine attorney for G Lawrence Critchfield and Western Real 
Estate Investment and hereby withdraws from the case as he has been terminated as legal counsel 
by Mr. Critchfield both for himself and for Western Real Estate Investment 
No motions are pending which have not been ruled upon and a notice of readiness for trial 
has not been filed although a trial date has been scheduled by the C/6u t^. 
Dated this 12,h day of June 2003 
U///)*<. 
Wesley F Sine #2967 
Attorney For Defendant 
IBM Building Suite 355 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 1 
Telephone 801 364-5125 
Fax 801 521-0732 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL L HENDRY. DOUGLAS 
BASSETT, & FIVE "T" CORPORATION 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
UNIDYN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, DOUGLAS 
LONGFELLOW, G LAWRENCE 
CRJTCHFIELD, PAUL CHRISTENSEN 
WESTERN REAL ESTATE INVEST-
MENT TRUST, and DOES 1-10 
Defendants 
MOTION TO ALLOW 
WITHDRAWL OF COUNSEL 
Civil # 990906082 
Judge Roger S Dutson 
COMES now Wesley F Sine and MOVES the Court for permission to withdraw as 
attorney for G Lawrence Critchfield and Western Real Estate Investment as Defendants have 
terminated Wesley F Sine as their attorney From the tenor of the Termination Letter, it would 
be impossible for Wesley F Sine to continue as counsel 
The case presently has been scheduled for trial in October 2003 although no Notice of 
Readiness for trial has been filed. There are no pending motions to Sine's knowledge with are 
pending 
Dated this 12,h day of June 2003 
il/XtCr^s v ^ C 
Wesley F. Sine #2967 
Attorney For Defendant 
IBM Building Suite 355 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801 364-5125 
Fax: 801 521-0732 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL L HENDRY. DOUGLAS 
BASSETT, & FIVE "T" CORPORATION 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIDYN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT " CORPORATION, DOUGLAS 
LONGFELLOW, G LAWRENCE ] 
CRITCHFIELD, PAUL CHRISTENSEN 
WESTERN REAL ESTATE INVEST-
MENT TRUST, and DORS 1-10 
Defendants. 
| ORDER ALLOWING 
| WITHDRAWL OF COUNSEL 
Civil # 990906082 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
THE COURT, good cause appearing, hereby Orders that Wesley F Sine be allowed to 
withdraw as Counsel for G Lawrence Critchfield and Western Real Estate Investment in the 
above titled case. 
Dated this day of June 2003 
BY THE COURT 
CERTIFICATION OF MAILING 
I here by certifV that a true and correct copy of the above Withdrawal of Counsel. Motion 
To Allow Withdrawal of Counsel, and Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel were sent 
this 12th day of June 2003 postage prepaid to 
Derek Langton 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Timothy Blackburn 
Van Cott Bagley 
2404 Washington Blvd. #900 
Ogden Utah 84401 
G Lawrence Critchfield 
Western Real Estate Investment 
f 
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DEREK LANGTON (4068) SECOV.O PiSTp'fr On.'<' T 
SHANE D. HILLMAN (8194) " ' "v"' 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801; 536-6111 
Attorneys for Defendant WESPAC Holdings, LLC 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL L. HENDRY, DOUGLAS BASSETT, 
and FIVE "T" CORPORATION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIDYN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION; DOUGLAS LONGFELLOW; 
G. LAWRENCE CRITCHFIELD; PAUL 
CHRISTENSEN, WESPAC HOLDINGS, L.L.C.; 
KEN MORGAN; WESTERN REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT TRUST, INC.; AND DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO APPEAR OR APPOINT 
COUNSEL 
Case No. 990906932 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
TO: LAWRENCE G. CRITCHFIELD 
40 North State Street, Suite 3G 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Pursuant to Rule 4-506(4) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. NOTICE IS 
HEREBY GIVEN to said defendant, Lawrence G. Critchfield, that he has the responsibility to 
536336 1 
retain another attorney or appear in person in the above-captioned case. Such notice is given as 
the result of the Withdrawal of Counsel filed by Wesley F. Sine, dated June 12, 2003. Pursuant 
to said Rule 4-506(4), no further proceedings shall be held in this matter until twenty (20) days 
from the date of this notice, unless said Lawrence G. Critchfield waives the time requirement or 
unless otherwise ordered by the Court. 
DATED this I £ -flay of June, 2003. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
SHANE D. HILLMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant WESPAC Holdings, LLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of June, 2003,1 caused to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO APPEAR OR 
APPOINT COUNSEL to: 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
Mara A. Brown 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
2404 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5783 
Fax: (801) 627-2522 
Wesley F. Sine 
IBM Building, Suite 355 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lawrence G. Critchfield 
40 North State Sireet, Suite 3G 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3156 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
Attorneys for Defendants Western Real Estate Investment Trust, Inc. and G. Lawrence 
Critchfield 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL L. HENDRY, DOUGLAS 
BASSET, AND FIVE "T" 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UN1DYN FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 
DOUGLAS LONGFELLOW, G. 
LAWRENCE CRITCHFIELD, PAUL 
CHRISTENSEN, WESPAC 
HOLDINGS, L.L.C., KEN MORGAN, 
WESTERN REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT TRUST, INC., and 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF G. LAWRENCE 
CRITCHFIELD IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990906932 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
G. LAWRENCE CRITCHFIELD, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and says that he is an adult resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and that: 
1. Upon the commencement of this lawsuit, I hired Wesley Sine ("Sine") to represent 
me. 
2. I received a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel dated June 16, 2003 from co-
defendant's counsel, Mr. Langton. This notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
3. This notice contained no statement that a trial date had been set. 
4. I did not ever receive a notice to appear or to appoint new counsel from any of the 
Plaintiffs. 
5. I neither received a copy of a notice to withdraw nor any motion for permission to 
withdraw from Mr. Sine. 
6. After I received Mr. Langton's Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel, I called Alan 
Mecham of the law firm of Mackey, Price and Thompson in Salt Lake City, Utah, an 
attorney, who had represented me in business matters in the past. 
7. Mr. Mecham told me that he would make some calls to ascertain the status of the case, 
but he stated that he was not able to enter an appearance to represent me. 
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8. While I was out of town at the end of September and beginning of October, 2003,1 
received word from my wife that a trial brief and a subpoena had come in the mail. 
9. Neither document my wife received had a trial date on it. 
10. I contacted a friend of mine, Richard Christensen, to look in to the status of trial in 
this case while I was out of town. 
11. After the fact, I learned that the court had proceeded with trial that next day after 
my wife contacted me about the trial brief and subpoena. 
12. At no time did Sine, the court clerk or anyone else notify me or otherwise advise 
me that a trial on this lawsuit had been scheduled in this case. 
13. The court's docket is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
14. I did not receive the letter of the court dated July 1, 2003 indicating the date trial 
was set. This letter, copied to Mr. Sine, is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". 
15. The court's minutes are attached hereto as Exhibit "D". 
16. The court's judgment dated November 13, 2003 is attached hereto as Exhibit "E". 
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& DATED this Z& day of January, 2004. 
JL Q_77JZ 
G. Lawrence Critcbiield 
2004. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this W& day of January, 
Notary Public • 
CHELSEA MELGAR I 
55 South 500 West, #614 . 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 | 
My Commission Expires • 
March 26,2007 | 
— ^ S P l i W f i i mm Ji 
Notary Public 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the isy' day of February, 2004 
a true and correct copy of the above AFFIDAVIT was mailed postage prepaid to the 
following: 
Timothy W. Blackburn 
Mara A. Brown 
Attorneys for Michael L. Hendry 
Douglas Bassett, and Five "T" Corp. 
2404 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
flAtfrykeA^ 
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